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Abstract 
This paper estimates productivity and efficiency of ten major microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 
Bangladesh using the stochastic frontier output distance function approach. Cobb-Douglas 
specification is applied with two outputs and four inputs for the period 2003-2011. Analysis 
reveals that on an average the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in MFIs was 2.6%, 
mostly due to technological progress (2.5%), while the average efficiency change was only 0.1%. 
The mean efficiency of microfinance firms was 0.765, which implies that MFIs could have 
produced 23.5% more with the current levels of input bundles if they had been fully efficient. 
The determinants of firms’ inefficiencies are cost per borrower and operational self-sufficiency, 
significant at the 1% level. The smaller MFIs (RDRS, Shakti, SSS, and JCF) define better frontiers 
than others, while bigger MFIs (BRAC, ASA, and GB) have been catching up faster than others.   
Key words: Stochastic frontier output distance, total factor productivity (TFP), microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
The birth of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) was in Bangladesh about three decades ago and 
over time it has been spreading to Asian, African, and Latin American countries. MFIs act as 
financial intermediaries, and their sources of funds are donor aid, loans from commercial banks 
and Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), client savings, and their own cumulative surplus 
(MRA, 2010). MFIs provide microcredit to poor people without collateral and collect this loan 
along with interest in installments. The goals of MFIs are quite different from those of 
traditional financial institutions, that is, commercial banks and credit unions. Originally, they 
had two broad goals, (i) to earn revenue to cover operating and financial expenses known as 
the ‘institutionist paradigm’ (Woller et al., 1999; Murdoch, 2000), and (ii) to attain social goals, 
including poverty alleviation, known as the ‘welfarists paradigm’ (Haq et al., 2010). Attaining 
these goals, an MFI must operate efficiently (Brau and Woller, 2004). However, the activities of 
MFIs have been criticized, particularly because of the charging excessive interest rates1. The 
interest rates among MFIs in Bangladesh vary widely (table A.1) as do the number and amount 
of the loan installments. The determinants of interest rates are cost of funds, administrative 
expenses, loan losses, and desired capitalization rate (Write and Alamgir, 2004). The CGAP 
(2006) study found that the pricing decision of MFIs depends on quality service, competitive 
locations, flexible product characteristics, and product add-ons.2 The products of microfinance 
organizations used to be homogeneous but now they produce differentiated products3. Some 
MFIs have even started to sell IPOs (initial public offerings) in the open market.4 Dr. 
Muhammad Yunus defined them as ‘new users’ and “loan sharks” who are moving away from 
their main goals (Yunus, 2011). These MFIs may depart from their original objectives due to 
high risk and uncertainty are associated with microcredit activities as well as significantly 
decrease in donor funds (from 40% of the funds in 1996 to 3.82% in 2011 (Pine, 2010; MRA, 
                                                          
1 Based on the commercial MFIs in 73 countries, Assefa et al. (2013) found that the MFIs enjoy some level of 
market power that enables them to earn profit (charge interest rate above marginal cost).  
2 MFIs may introduce other types of loan (i.e. housing loan, education loan) or other financial services (i.e. savings 
or insurance linked to the loan). 
3 Microcredit for small-scale self-employment based activities, microenterprise loans, loans for the ultra poor, 
agricultural loans, seasonal loans, and loans for disaster management.  
4 SKS in India and Compartamos in Mexico have started to sell their IPOs.  
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2011)). In Bangladesh, the current government has been trying to intervene in the microfinance 
market that might not be able to solve this problem. The state government of Andhra Pradesh 
in India passed a law to protect poor people whereby borrowers need not repay their small-
scale loan, which caused much turmoil in the area of microfinance (Banerjee, 2010).  
Whether the microcredit programs of MFIs have a positive impact on society is debatable. 
Banerjee et al. (2009) found that access to microcredit in India does have a positive impact on 
the consumption of durable goods, but no impact on measures of health, education, or 
women’s decision-making. In Bangladesh, the microcredit programs of MFIs have had a positive 
impact on the society as a whole, helping the poor out of poverty by generating employment 
and increasing household income (Hossain, 1984 and 1988; BIDS, 1990; World Bank, 1999). 
Agricultural and nonagricultural investment, human capital, and fixed capital investment have 
increased (PKSF, 2010). The empowerment of women has been enhanced (Amin, et al., 1998), 
as women are the beneficiaries of most programs (more than 80%). Wadud (2013) found that 
microcredit positively affects and helps strengthen food security. Comparing microcredit 
receivers and non-receivers, he also showed that receivers earn more than non-receivers.  
The coverage of MFIs has expanded significantly, and nowadays, the activities of MFIs can be 
found in almost every corner of Bangladesh. However, some are of the opinion that microcredit 
programs make poor people poorer. The current government has been trying to publicize the 
Grameen Bank (GB), the country’s largest microcredit lender, which charges the lowest interest 
rate among MFIs in the market. The government of Bangladesh used to provide subsidized 
agricultural/rural credit to poor farmers through specialized state-owned banks;5 however, 
default rates were very high and over the years the government would waive all defaulted 
loans.  
Such perverse incentives are not good for any organization’s long-term sustainability. The loan 
recovery rate of MFIs is over 95 percent, which involves significant administrative expenses. 
                                                          
5 Bangladesh Agricultural Bank and Rajshahi Agricultural Development Bank 
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The risks of providing loans are also high as MFIs do not know the private information6 of poor 
people. As a result, MFIs have two options, which are to increase interest rates and fees to 
recover expenses or to promote market-based services to sustain them in the long run (Rauf 
and Mahamood, 2009). Some microfinance organizations may be more efficient and technically 
developed than others so they may charge lower interests. My purpose, therefore, is to 
estimate the inefficiency and productivity of 10 major MFIs between 2003 and 2011 in 
Bangladesh.  
A significant number of studies have been conducted to examine the performance of financial 
institutions (banks, credit unions) but not many on microfinance institutions. In 1997, Berger 
and Humphrey surveyed 130 studies that estimated the efficiency of financial institutions in 21 
countries.  Interest in the area of microfinance since 2000 has been increased may be due to 
the realization that microfinance institutions are important to the economy and to the 
development of a very rigorous dataset by MIX Market. A short review of the available 
literature related to the efficiency analysis of MFIs is presented in the Appendix Table A.3. 
Twelve studies out of eighteen used nonparametric analysis (data envelope analysis, index 
number approaches) to examine the performance of MFIs. In the remaining studies, nobody 
used stochastic frontier distance function specification. In this study, I used a parametric 
method (stochastic frontier distance function) to estimate the efficiency and productivity of 
major microfinance institutions in Bangladesh. The results show productivity grew an average 
of 2.6 percent during the period 2003 to 2011, largely due to technological progress (2.5 
percent).  
This paper is organized into four sections. Following the introduction section, Section II presents 
an overview of microfinance institutions in Bangladesh. Section III describes the inputs and 
outputs selection procedures and their characteristics and the methods of measuring the 
efficiency and productivity of MFIs in Bangladesh. Section IV presents the results of empirical 
estimation, and conclusions are drawn in the final section.       
                                                          
6 Microcredit borrowers are taking multiple loans from different microfinance sources at the same time. A survey 
in 2000 shows that about 12.6% of borrowers in Bangladesh were found to be participating in multiple MFIs (Zohir, 
2011); loan use might be completely different from the loan objective i.e. a loan for buying a goat or cow might be 
spent on durable goods. If this is so, then providing loans to this group would be more risky.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN BANGLADESH 
More than 1200 microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate in Bangladesh (CDF, 2005). These 
organizations can be categorized into four groups: (i) the Grameen Bank (GB); (ii) private 
microfinance institutions (NGO-MFIs); (iii) commercial and specialized banks; and (iv) the 
microfinance program of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), cooperative 
societies, and agencies sponsored by the government (MRA, 2010). The Grameen Bank and 
nine other NGO-MFIs (ASA, BRAC, BURO Bangladesh, JCF, RDRS, Shakti, SSS, TMSS, and 
UDDIPAN7) capture more than two thirds of market share (averaged 2009-2011).8 GB alone 
captures 30% and two giant microfinance institutions, BRAC and ASA, together capture another 
35% of market share. A brief introduction to GB, ASA, and BRAC (three big sharks) is given 
below:  
Grameen Bank (GB)-Bank for the Poor 
The Grameen Bank is the pioneer microcredit institution in Bangladesh, jointly established in 
1979 by Professor Muhammad Yunus and the then government after achieving positive results 
from the demonstrated action research project of 1976-1979. Today, GB borrowers own 90 
percent of its share and the rest is owned by the government. The main objectives of the GB 
are to extend banking facilities to rural men and women and to eliminate the exploitation of 
poor people by money lenders. It provides credit to the poorest people of Bangladesh without 
any collateral fee. The GB’s coverage area is about 97% of all villages in Bangladesh. It has more 
than 8 million borrowers (97% of them are women) and serves them from its 2,565 branches.9 
The GB provides the poor with micro-enterprise loans, housing loans, higher education loans, 
loan insurance, life insurance, and village phones. In 2006, this organization won the Nobel 
Peace Prize for its contributions to the social and economic development of Bangladesh. GB is 
                                                          
7 ASA = Association for Social Advancement; BRAC = Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, GB = Grameen 
Bank; JCF = Jagoroni Chakra Foundation; RDRS = Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service; TMSS = Thengamara Mohila Sabuj 
Sangha; Shakti = Shakti Foundation for Disadvantaged Women; SSS = Society for Social Service; UDDIPAN = United 
Development Initiatives for Programmed Actions. 
8 Market share has been estimated according to the number of active borrowers. This holds even if the amount of 
loan outstanding or amount of savings is considered.  
9 For those interested in knowing more about GB, please visit its website: http://www.grameen.com/ 
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the only one organization that charges lowest interest rates in Bangladesh (table A.2). Bairagi 
and Azzam (2014) found that GB’s market is about 3% above marginal cost.            
 
BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee)   
BRAC is a nongovernmental development organization founded by Sir Fazle Hasan Abed, won 
2015 World Food Prize, immediately after the independence of Bangladesh in 1972. Currently 
BRAC has a presence in all districts of Bangladesh as well as in other parts of Asia (Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka), Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
and Uganda), and the Americas (Haiti). Its mission is “to empower people and communities in 
situations of poverty, illiteracy, disease and social injustice”.10 BRAC has about 6 million 
microfinance borrowers and controls about 22 percent of market share in the microfinance 
sector. In addition to its microfinance operation, BRAC has 15 other programs, including 
agriculture and food security, education, public health, social development, disaster relief, and 
ICT development, worldwide. BRAC’s interest rates are higher than the interest rates charged 
by GB (table A.2).   
 
ASA (Association for Social Advancement) 
ASA is a nongovernmental development organization in Bangladesh, established in 1978. The 
objectives of ASA are to “alleviate poverty and improve the quality of lives of the landless and 
assetless rural poor by providing them with access to financial services”.11 It offers both 
financial (loans, savings, insurance, foreign remittance services) and nonfinancial services 
(health and education). In 2007, ASAI (ASA INTERNATIONAL) was born and started to extend its 
range to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ghana, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nigeria 
with a view to empowering the poorest and most deprived populations of the world. The total 
number of ASA borrowers is about 4.5 million.   
 
                                                          
10 http://www.brac.net/content/who-we-are-mission-vision#.UZzt-6LVCSo 
11 http://asa.org.bd/?page_id=29 
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II. METHOD AND DATA 
II.1 Stochastic Frontier Distance Function Approach (SFDA)   
The following section is adapted from Coelli and Perelman (1996) and O’Donnell and Coelli 
(2003). In this study, the following functional form for the distance function has been used as it 
is flexible and easy to estimate (Coelli and Perelman, 1996). The functional form of Cobb-
Douglas output distance technology for 𝑀 outputs and 𝑁 inputs can be specified as 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑂𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚  ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖 +
𝑀
𝑚=1
∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 … … … … … … … … … … (2.2.1),
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
where 𝑦𝑚𝑖  is the vector of outputs produced by firm 𝑖; 𝑥𝑛𝑖  is the vector of inputs used by firm 𝑖 
to produce 𝑦𝑚𝑖. 𝑣𝑖  is a random variable introduced into the equation to capture the 
approximation errors and statistical noise. This function is nondecreasing in 𝑦 and 
nonincreasing in 𝑥, linearly homogenous in 𝑦, convex in y, and quasi-convex in x. 
In the previous model, it is impossible to observe dependent variables. Therefore, homogeneity 
in outputs restriction can be imposed, and the model (2.2.1) can be fit econometrically. The 
homogeneity condition implies that  
𝐷𝑂𝑖(𝑥, 𝜆𝑦) = 𝜆𝐷𝑂𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦). 
Here, if one output such as 𝑦𝑀 is chosen arbitrarily and set 𝜆 =
1
𝑦𝑀⁄ , we will have  
𝐷𝑂𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦/𝑦𝑀) =
𝐷𝑂𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑦𝑀
. 
For equation 2.2.1, this will provide 
ln (𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝑦𝑀)⁄ = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚  ln (𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀)⁄ +
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 … … … … … … … … … … (2.2.2).
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
In equation 2.2.2, the expression of the second term on the right is M-1 instead of M because 
when 𝑦𝑚 = 𝑦𝑀, the ratio is equal to one and the log of this ratio is zero. Rearranging equation 
2.2.2, we get  
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− ln 𝑦𝑀 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚  ln (𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀)⁄ +
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 − ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 … … … … … … … … … (2.2.3).
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Equation 2.2.3 can be estimated by applying the stochastic frontier approach proposed by 
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), which involves two error terms: a symmetric error, 𝑣𝑖, 
associated with noise and an asymmetric error, 𝑢𝑖 , associated with technical inefficiency. Thus, 
we get the following output distance function: 
− ln 𝑦𝑀 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚  ln (𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀)⁄ +
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 … … … … … … … … … … (2.2.4),
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
where − ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 =>  𝐷𝑂𝑖 = 𝑒
−𝑢𝑖 =>  𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp (−𝑢𝑖)- is the technical efficiency of the i-
th firm’s production.  
The parameters of equation 2.2.4 can be estimated with appropriate distributional assumptions 
of vi and ui. Regarding this, the specification by Battese & Coelli (1995) was followed. The 
random variables, vi, are 𝑖𝑖𝑑 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and independently distributed of ui. The random 
variables, ui, are assumed to be non-negative and responsible for technical inefficiency in 
production and are independently distributed as truncations at zero the distribution with 
nonzero mean, 𝑖𝑖𝑑~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2).  
In estimating unknown parameters, the maximum likelihood (ML) method was applied. The 
package ‘frontier’ by Coelli and Henningsen (2013) in software R version 2.15.2 was used to 
estimate unknown parameters and the output distance predictions.  
II.2 Data: Inputs and Outputs Selection   
Outputs of financial institutions can be measured in two ways, which are the ‘production 
approach’ and the ‘intermediation approach’ (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In the first 
approach, financial institutions are thought of as producers, while in the second approach, 
institutions are thought of as intermediaries. In the case of NGO-MFIs in Bangladesh, about 38% 
of their funds come from loans and the rest from clients’ savings and cumulative surpluses. In 
the first case, MFIs in Bangladesh can be thought of as financial intermediaries, while in the 
9 
 
second case, MFIs can be thought of as producers. In this study, the production approach has 
been applied to select outputs and inputs to estimate the efficiency of 10 major microfinance 
institutions in Bangladesh. Two outputs (gross loan portfolio and interest and fee income), four 
inputs (total assets, operating expenses, financial expenses, and number of staff), and five 
efficiency variable were used. Data for each of these MFIs were gathered from the MIX Market 
covering the period 2003-2011. The definition and descriptive statistics of these variables are 
provided in the Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5.  
The average annual growth rates of outputs and inputs are presented in Figure 2.2.1. The 
median growth of gross loan portfolio is about 0.18; five microfinance institutions (JCF, SSS, 
UDDIPAN, BURO, and TMSS) are above median growth, and the other five are below median 
growth. The median growth of interest and fee income is about 0.20. In this case, microfinance 
institutions that are above median growth are the same as gross loan portfolio, except TMSS. 
The growth patterns for both outputs are almost similar. Figure 2.2.2 reveals that the growth 
rates of financial expenses have been higher than other inputs. 
Figure 2.2.1 Annual average growth rates (%) of outputs (left panel) and inputs (right panel), 
2003-2011 
  
Source: Author’s estimation based on data gathered from MIX Market (2013) 
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
Two empirical models have been estimated which can be rewritten from the equation 2.2.4 as 
follows: 
−ln 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1ln (𝑦2𝑖𝑡 𝑦1𝑖𝑡)⁄ + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   𝑖
= 1,2, … … … 10, … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (3.1) 
 
−ln 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑦2𝑖𝑡 𝑦1𝑖𝑡)⁄ + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇
+  ∑ 𝛾𝑙
10
𝑙=2
𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑙 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … . . … . (3.2) 
𝑦𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖, are described in the Appendix Table A.3. 𝑇 is the time period that is considered to 
capture the technological change. 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑙  are firm dummies, where  𝑙 = 2, … … 10. The 
distribution of error terms, 𝜀𝑖, is described in the methodology section. In addition, some 
inefficiency parameters, 𝑧𝑖, are included in the model.    
𝑢𝑖 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑧
5
𝑧=1
𝑍𝑧𝑖 … … … . . (3.3) 
The estimated coefficients from the previous two models are presented in Table 3.1. To 
compare two frontier models, a likelihood ratio test was conducted that shows the Chi-square 
statistic (85.21) is statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming that additional variables are 
needed in the model. Thus the second functional specification is chosen for estimating firm-
specific efficiency because most of the firm dummies used are significant, which also clearly 
reveals that microfinance institutions are heterogeneous. Table 3.1 shows that the signs of all 
parameters estimated from the previous two equations are expected and agree with each 
other. Note that signs on the left in the equations 3.1 and 3.2 are negative so when we read 
Table 3.1 signs will be the other way around. For example, if total assets increase 10% then 
gross loan portfolio will increase 4.74%. The results reveal that if the costs of microfinance 
institutions increase (operating expenses, financial expenses, number of staff) then gross loan 
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portfolios will increase, which makes sense because MFIs are required to increase gross 
portfolio to recover expenses. Total assets and operating expenses are significant at the 1% 
level and correlate positively with gross loan portfolio. Conversely, the coefficient of ratio of 
interest and fee income to gross portfolio is significant at the 1% level and correlates negatively 
with gross loan portfolio. The coefficient of time reveals the technological progress/regress of 
MFIs. The result shows that the technological growth of MFIs was 2.5 percent during the period 
2003-2011, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.      
The estimated mean efficiency of MFIs ranges between 0.769 and 0.847, which implies that 
firms do have options to increase their efficiency. In other words, firms can produce 15.3% to 
23.1% more than existing levels with the current levels of input vectors. The estimated lamda 
value is large, which implies that total error variance is mainly due to inefficiency, while random 
errors are not important. In other words, the variance for efficiency is larger than the variance 
for random errors.    
Table 3.1 also reveals that the signs of all the inefficiency parameters estimated from the two 
functional specifications are the same except for two inefficiency variables (percentage of 
female borrowers and loan loss rate). The operational self-sufficiency and cost per borrower 
are significant at the 1% level and negatively correlate with inefficiency. This suggests that if the 
cost per borrower and operational self-sufficiency increase, the firms’ inefficiency will decrease. 
Thus, the firms’ strategy should be to minimize cost per borrower; if so, the operational self-
sufficiency would be bigger as it is defined as the share of financial revenue to the total 
expenses. The debt to equity is defined as the firms’ liability in terms of capital (equity); a small 
share of liability to capital is expected. If the debt to equity ratio increases, the inefficiency of 
MFIs should increase; in this case, the first specification also gives the expected sign. Qayyum 
and Ahmad (2006) also found negative signs of this variable, though they used technical 
efficiency as a function of debt to equity along with other variables.  
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Table 3.1 Estimated coefficients from Cobb-Douglas stochastic distance function 
[Dependent variable: Gross loan 
portfolio] 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables  Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
Independent variables       
Intercept  𝛼0 -0.508 0.742 -1.999*** 0.744 
Interest and fee income
gross loan portfolio
 
𝛼1 
0.516*** 0.124 0.638*** 0.068 
Total assets 𝛽1 -0.466*** 0.096 -0.474*** 0.070 
Operating expenses  𝛽2 -0.365*** 0.120 -0.270*** 0.069 
Financial expenses 𝛽3 -0.111 0.069 -0.106** 0.042 
Number of staff 𝛽4 -0.061 0.101 -0.040 0.048 
Time  𝛽5 -0.012 0.013 -0.025*** 0.009 
FirmDummy2    -0.102* 0.055 
FirmDummy3    0.242** 0.119 
FirmDummy4    0.029 0.071 
FirmDummy5    0.387** 0.156 
FirmDummy6    0.429*** 0.142 
FirmDummy7    0.311* 0.142 
FirmDummy8    0.417*** 0.132 
FirmDummy9    0.252** 0.105 
FirmDummy10    0.404*** 0.152 
Inefficiency variables       
Intercept  𝛿0 -0.294 0.548 -0.057 0.176 
% of female borrowers 𝛿1 0.125 0.805 -0.149 0.175 
Operational self-sufficiency  𝛿2 0.203* 0.113 0.258*** 0.034 
Cost per borrower 𝛿3 0.020** 0.010 0.011*** 0.003 
Loan loss rate  𝛿4 -0.002 0.993 0.200 0.337 
Debt to equity ratio 𝛿5 -0.036*** 0.009 0.002 0.004 
Sigma squared  𝜎2
= 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 0.010*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.0005 
Gamma  𝛾
=
𝜎2
𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2
 
0.825*** 0.134 0.999*** 0.008 
Variance for inefficiency 𝜎𝑢
2 0.008  0.003  
Variance for random error 𝜎𝑣
2 0.002  0.00003  
Lambda 𝜆
= √𝜎𝑢2 𝜎𝑣2⁄  2.171  9.950  
Mean efficiency  0.847  0.769  
Log likelihood  91.793  134.398  
Source: Author’s estimation, 2013. 
Note: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.   
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The total factor productivity (TFP) growth, efficiency change (EC), and technological change (TC) 
in major microfinance institutions in Bangladesh are shown in Figure 3.1. During the period 
2003-2011, TFP grew at 2.6 percent, mostly due to technological progress (2.5 percent). During 
the same period, the rate of technical efficiency showed positive growth, but only 0.1%. Firm-
specific changes in levels of efficiency show the efficiency growth of the three largest 
microfinance institutions (BRAC, ASA, and GB) was more than 1% between 2003 and 2011 
(Figure 3.2). Three MFIs (JCF, RDRS, and Shakti) experienced positive growth ranging from 0.3% 
to 0.6%, while four MFIs experienced negative efficiency growth (SSS, UDDIPAN, BURO, and 
TMSS).  
Figure 3.1 TFP growth (geometric mean) in MFIs of Bangladesh, 2003-2011  
 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2013 
 
Figure 3.2 Efficiency change (EC) in MFIs of Bangladesh, 2004-2011  
 
Source: Author’s estimation, 2013 
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The distribution of efficiency scores by each observation as well as by microfinance firms is 
presented in Figure 3.3. The left panel shows that most of the points are far away from the fully 
efficient points; in other words, the points are not close to the production possibility frontier 
(PPF). This implies that these microfinance firms have never been on the frontier. If the average 
efficiency scores are distributed by firms, similar results are found. Only two microfinance firms 
(RDRS, efficiency score 0.793 and Shakti, efficiency score 0.816) are close to the PPF compared 
to other firms. Four firms (SSS followed by JCF, ASA, and BRAC) are close to the average 
efficiency score (0.765), while the other four firms (BURO, GB, TMSS, and UDDIPAN) are below 
the average efficiency score. Note that the range of average technical efficiency scores is 
between 0.724 and 0.816. Based on the efficiency ranking (Appendix Figure A.2), it can be 
inferred that smaller microfinance institutions, with the exceptions of TMSS and UDDIPAN, 
define better frontiers than bigger microfinance institutions.  
Figure 3.3 Frequency distribution of levels of TE by observations (left panel) and by MFIs (right 
panel) 
  
Source: Author’s estimation (2013) 
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The average and firm-specific evolutions of the levels of technical efficiencies are presented in 
Figure 3.4, which reveals no microfinance institutions were on the frontier in the period 2003 to 
2011. Only one organization, RDRS, reached full efficiency (on the frontier) in 2011. This 
organization currently works in 16 northern districts of Bangladesh. RDRS became an 
autonomous national NGO in 1997, though it was established by the Lutheran World 
Federation/Department for World Service in 1972 to assist the population of the Rangpur and 
Dinajpur areas with relief and rehabilitation immediately after the War of Independence.12 
Figure 3.3 shows that the evolutions of the levels of technical efficiencies of all bigger 
microfinance institutions were trending upward. This implies that these firms were catching up 
to the best technology frontiers faster than others. The evolutions of the levels of technical 
efficiencies of small microfinance institutions were static in the period 2003-2011.  
Figure 3.4 Evolution of the levels of efficiencies of MFIs in Bangladesh  
  
  
  
Source: Author’s estimation, 2013 
                                                          
12 http://www.rdrsbangla.net/Page.php?pageId=MTU1NA== 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper used the parametric approach (Stochastic frontier distance function) to estimate the 
inefficiency and productivity of 10 major MFIs in Bangladesh. Gross loan portfolio and interest 
and fee income were considered as outputs, while total assets, operating expenses, financial 
expenses, and number of staff were used as inputs. Data were collected from MIX Market. The 
data covers the period from 2003 to 2011. To capture technological change, a time trend was 
added in the distance function. Five efficiency variables, operational self-sufficiency, loan loss 
rate, debt to equity ratio, cost per borrower, and percentage of female borrowers, were also 
included to capture the firms’ inefficiencies. The results show that on an average the rate of TFP 
growth in MFIs was 2.6% during the period 2003-2011, mostly due to technological progress 
(2.5%).  
The estimated mean efficiency was 0.765, which implies that firms could have produced 23.1% 
more than the existing levels with their current levels of input bundles if they had been fully 
efficient. The determinants of the firms’ inefficiencies were cost per borrower and operational 
self-sufficiency, which were significant at the 1% level. The estimated lamda value was large, 
meaning that total error variance was mainly due to inefficiency, while random errors were not 
important. The ranking of firm-specific average technical efficiencies revealed that smaller 
microfinance institutions (RDRS, Shakti, SSS, and JCF) defined better frontiers than others. The 
firm-specific evolutions of the levels of technical efficiencies showed bigger MFIs (BRAC, ASA, 
and GB) were catching up to the best frontiers faster than other microfinance institutions.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1 Distribution of the interest rate (flat rate) 
Interest rates Number of MFIs % of total MFIs 
2-5 0 0.00 
5-8 3 0.56 
8-11 3 0.56 
11-12.5 18 3.36 
12.5 180 33.6 
12.5-15 3 0.56 
15 309 57.8 
15-20 2 0.37 
20 5 0.93 
Above 20 0 0.00 
Total 508 100.0 
Source: Mahmud and Khalily (2008) 
 
Figure A.2 Flat rate and annual percentage rate (APR) of largest MFIs in Bangladesh 
 
Source: For GB, Grameen Bank Year End Update: December, 2010; For PKSF to POs, Annual Report 2010 by PKSF; 
For BRAC and ASA, Write and Alamgir (2004)  
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Table A.3 Recent studies related to microfinance institutions 
Approaches  Country/Countries Data period  Outputs  Inputs  Results Author 
Data 
Envelopmen
t 
Analysis 
(DEA) 
Pakistan 2003-2007; 
Pakistan 
Microfinance 
Network 
Gross Loan Portfolio and 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Total Assets and 
Number of Personnel 
Mean efficiency: 0.571-
0.717 
Ahmad 
(2011) 
DEA (CCR 
and BBC) 
Mediterranean zone 
(35 institutions) 
2004-2005, MIX 
Market 
Number of women and 
ROA (return on assets) 
Number of employees 
(staff), total amount of 
assets   
Eight institutions are 
efficient. Medium 
institutions are more 
efficient  
Bassem 
(2008) 
Bootstrap-
DEA 
MENA region  2006-2009 Financial revenue, indicator 
of benefit to the poorest  
Total assets, operating 
expenses, number of 
employee  
Average efficiency of 
most countries of the 
MENA region has 
Decreased  
Ben 
Abdelkader, 
et al. (2012) 
DEA, SFA,  Surveyed 130 
studies in 21 
countries that 
applied frontier 
efficiency 
Production and Intermediation approaches  They found that various 
efficiency methods do 
not necessarily provide 
consistent results 
Berger and 
Humphrey 
(1997) 
DEA, DFA 
(distribution
-free 
approach), 
and SFA 
796 microfinance 
institutions (MFI) 
across 88 
countries in 6 
regions  
2005-2009 Gross loan portfolio;  
Inverse of the average loan 
balance per borrower per 
GNI 
Personnel and total 
borrowings. 
Operating 
expenses per personnel 
and financial expenses 
per total borrowings 
Rankings of MFIs’ 
efficiency were found to 
robust across 
identification strategies 
Bolli and Vo 
Thi (2012) 
Index 
number 
approach 
(Malmquist) 
Ethiopia  2004-2009 Interests and fee income, 
gross loan portfolio, and 
number of loans 
outstanding 
Number of employees 
and operating expenses 
Productivity grew at 
3.8% annually which is 
due to the progress of 
technical efficiency   
Gebremichael 
(2012) 
DEA To estimate social 
efficiency for 89 
MFIs. Microfinance 
Information 
eXchange (MIX) 
2003 1. Number of active 
women borrowers 
2. Indicator of benefit to 
the poor 
3. Gross loan 
portfolio(GLP) 
1. Total assets 
2. Operating costs 
3. Number of 
Employees 
The analysis showed 
that there is a positive 
but low correlation 
between social 
efficiency and financial 
efficiency  
Gutiérez-
Nieto et al. 
(2009) 
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4. Financial revenue 
DEA 39 microfinance 
Institutions across 
Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America  
2004 
MIX Market  
 
1. Number of borrowers 
per 
staff 
2. Number of savers per 
staff 
member 
1. Gross loan portfolio 
2.Total savings 
Production approach: 
1. Labor 
2. Cost per borrower 
3. Cost per saver 
Intermediation 
approach: 
1. Total number of 
stuffs 
2. Operating/ 
administrative expenses 
NGO-MFIs are the most 
efficient under the 
production approach, 
however, under 
intermediation 
approach bank-
microfinance 
institutions outperform 
in the measure of 
efficiency  
Haq et al. 
(2010) 
Stochastic 
Cost Frontier  
155 MFIs from 45 
countries 
2000-2007 
www.ratingfund2.
org/ 
 
Number of borrowers Labor (employee), 
physical capital 
(operating expenses – 
personnel expenses 
divided by fixed assets), 
and financial capital 
“Efficiency increases 
with a board size of up 
to nine members and 
decreases after that”  
Hartarska and 
Mersland 
(2012) 
Malmquist 
index 
Latin American 
countries, Middle 
East and North 
African (MENA) 
countries, and South 
Asian countries 
MIX Market, 2002-
2005  
Gross Loan Portfolio,  
Total Funds,  
Financial Revenue,  
Number of Active 
Borrowers  
 
Financial expenses, 
operating expenses, 
loan loss provision 
expense, and labor   
South Asian MFIs have 
higher efficiencies than 
their counterparts in 
Latin America and 
MENA countries 
Hassan and 
Benito (2009) 
Stochastic 
frontier cost 
function 
Grameen Bank, 
Bangladesh  
1998-91 Loans, savings, and 
members 
Labor and capital and 
their prices  
Average inefficiency 
score for GB was found 
from 3-6% 
Hassan and 
Tufte (2001) 
DEA, Tobit 
regression  
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
(Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo) 
2002-2006 For financial efficiency 
Gross Loan Portfolio  
For social efficiency 
number of active 
borrowers, Index of 
Poverty, percent of women 
borrowers  
Financial efficiency 
Financial Expenditure, 
equity, PERS 
For social efficiency 
Financial Expenditure, 
Equity as capital, 
number of the MFIs’ 
workers 
Sustainability prevails  Kablan (2012) 
DEA, Tobit 
Regression  
Mexico Survey data.  
Data period: 2003-
2007 
 
Production: number of 
clients 
Intermediation approach: 
outstanding loan portfolio  
Total number of 
employees, 
administrative and 
marketing expenses 
most MFIs have been 
more efficient in 
pursuing sustainability 
(proxied by the 
Martínez-
González, A., 
2008 
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minus the total payroll, 
equity plus liabilities 
performing loan 
portfolio size) 
SFA 40 MFIs in India  2005-2008 Gross loan portfolio,  number of staff 
members, cost per 
borrower 
mean efficiency of 
microfinance 
institutions is 0.34 
Masood and 
Ahmad 
(2010) 
DEA, 
Malmquist 
index and 
Tobit 
Regression 
World wide 2005-2006 Gross loan portfolio, 
financial revenue, total 
subsidies (if it is positive) 
Total assets, operating 
costs, number of staff, 
total subsidies (if it is 
negative) 
“MFIs which cater to 
the poor tend to be 
more inefficient than 
those with clients 
relatively well off”. 
“Lending to women is 
efficient only in the 
presence of subsidies”. 
Nawaz (2010) 
DEA and 2nd 
stage Tobit 
regression   
44 microfinance in 
Vietnam   
Survey  Number of savers, number 
of borrowers 
and number of groups 
Labor cost and 
Non-labor costs 
(Administrative 
expense) 
Average technical 
efficiency: (SFA: 69%; 
DEA: 76%)  
Nghiem, et al 
(2006) 
Multivariate 
approach 
along with 
DEA 
30 Latin American 
MFI’s  
Microrate web 
page. Data period: 
2003 
Number of loans 
outstanding; gross loan 
portfolio; interest and fee 
income 
Credit officers and 
operating expenses 
Level of efficiency 
achieved by a 
MFI depends on the 
specification chosen 
Guitiérrez-
Nieto, et al 
(2007) 
DEA (both 
input-
oriented and 
output 
oriented) 
Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan 
Micro Finance 
Network, Pakistan 
and Mix Market 
Network 
Loans  Credit officers, cost per 
borrower  
Analysis of single 
country data showed 
that eight, six, and five 
MFIs form Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and India, 
respectively, were on 
the frontier  
Qayyum and 
Ahmad 
(2006) 
DEA, Tobit 
regression  
200 Australian credit 
unions 
Data, collected 
from Australian 
Financial 
Institutions 
Commission, 
corresponds to the 
financial year 
ending 30 June 
1997  
Personal loans and 
consumer credit facilities; 
property and real estate 
loans; commercial loans, 
deposits with other 
deposit-taking institutions; 
and financial securities 
Labor, physical capital, 
loanable funds   
Major sources of cost 
inefficiency is allocative 
inefficiency  
Worthington 
(2000) 
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Table A.4 Definition of outputs and inputs 
Variables   Definition 
Outputs    
Gross loan portfolio (USD) y1 All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including current, 
delinquent, and restructured loans; but not loans that have been written off; it 
does not include interest receivable and employee loans. 
Interest and fee income 
(USD) 
y2 Interest income is the amount of money received from borrowers (excluding 
principal), while fee income is the amount of money earned as service charges, 
commissions, and penalties on loan portfolio    
Inputs   
Total assets (USD) x1 Total of all net asset accounts  
Operating expenses (USD) x2 Personnel expenses and administrative expenses  
Financial expenses (USD x4 Total of financial expense on liabilities, net inflation adjustment, cost-of-funds 
adjustment, and other expenses from financial services 
Number of staff (Number) x3 Total number of personnel working  
Efficiency Variables    
Percent of female 
borrower 
z1 Number of active women borrowers
Adjusted number of active borrowers 
∗ 100 
Operational self-sufficiency
  
z2 Financial Revenue
Financial expense +  Net loan loss provision expense +  Operating expense
 
Cost per borrower z1 Adjusted operating expense
Adjusted average number of active borrowers
 
Loan loss rate z4 Adjusted write − offs, net recoveries
Adjusted average gross loan portfolio
 
Debt to equity ratio z5 Adjusted Total Liabilities
Adjusted Total Equity
 
Source: http://www.ruralfinance.org/fileadmin/templates/rflc/documents/1153991879090_Doc_8_2_Fin_Term_Definitions___Indicators.pdf 
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Table A.5 Descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper 
 Mean SD Max Min 
Gross loan portfolio (USD) 159751161 238169539 939129906 2476575 
Interest and fee income (USD) 41189598 63002289 273693774 758586 
Total assets (USD) 230269370 378972750 1698487761 3570572 
Operating expenses (USD) 18927373 26571552 97383681 402993 
Financial expenses (USD) 12679578 27125192 143731019 107258 
No. of staff (No.) 7424 9003 34841 273 
% of female borrowers 0.95 0.07 1.03 0.65 
Operational self-sufficiency 1.27 0.37 2.69 0.60 
Cost per borrower 12.16 4.42 24.26 4.33 
Loan loss rate 0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.01 
Debt to equity ratio 4.84 3.70 15.92 0.36 
Source: Estimated based on the data collected from MIX Market. 
 
